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In a risk society, intimacy falls under the category of rational management and 
individual reflexivities. Children are not an exception. This article attempts to shed light on 
this newly emerging figure of child in risk societalization of Korean society. We propose to 
grasp this figure of child as a risk-totem. For this, we refer to an important concept of 
Luhmann called self-observation of society. According to this insight, society observes itself 
through the mass media, sciences (sociology), and culture. In this context, we analyzed two 
major forms of self-observation of contemporary Korean risk society on the subject of child 
in particular: child abduction films and discourses on risk society. Through the 
examination of these two forms of self-observation of society, the semantics of child in a 
risk society are determined as a risk-totem. 
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Child Abduction Films
Korean cinema of the new millennium explored a specific theme which, 
hitherto, had not been prevalent as a cinematographic motive: child 
kidnapping. In the new millennium, numerous films were made in Korea 
under this theme, including the following movies: Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance (2002) by Park Chan-Wook, A Good Lawyer’s Wife (2003) by Im 
Sang-Soo, Sympathy for Lady Vengeance (2005) by Park Chan-Wook, A Cruel 
Attendance (2006) by Kim Tae-Yun, Voice of a Murderer (2006) by Park Jin-
Pyo, Secret Sunshine (2007) by Lee Chang-Dong, Seven Days (2007) by Won 
Shin-yon, The ESP Couple (2008) by Kim Hyung-Ju, No Mercy (2009) by Kim 
Hyung-Joon, Midnight FM (2010) by Kim Sang-Man, Man of Vendetta (2010) 
by Woo Min-Ho, Heartbeat (2010) by Yoon Jae-Kun, The Man from Nowhere 
(2010) by No Jung-Bum, Children (2011) by Lee Kyu-Man, and Montage 
(2013) by Jung Kun-Sop. 
Although child abduction films were produced and consumed 
intermittently prior to the new millennium, remarkable characteristics can be 
seen in this unforeseen emergence of child abduction films. Firstly, the 
production of child-abduction films was concentrated in a particular period 
of time, namely from 2002 to now. Especially from 2006 on, a genuine style of 
child abduction films combining the genre of thriller and the theme of child 
abduction seems to have been invented in Korean cinematography. Secondly, 
with some of them actually drawing on real-life events, these films evocate a 
strong sense of reality in comparison with other types of movies, to the extent 
that they demonstrate characteristics that are usually associated with 
documentary films. For example, Voice of a Murderer is based on the murder 
of a boy whose name is Lee Hyung-Ho in 1991, and Children is based on the 
disappearance of five children in Daegu (Songseo Elementary School) in 
1991.1 Thirdly, most of them were well-received by the Korean audience.2
This interesting phenomenon may generate various questions from a 
1 Along with the Hwaseong serial killing, these two tragedies have been labeled as the “three 
eternally unsolved cases” of contemporary Korean society.
2 According to the statistics from the Korean Film Council (http://www.kofic.or.kr/cms/64.do), 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance attracted 162,570 viewers, Sympathy for Lady Vengeance 3,174,173 
viewers, A Cruel Attendance 362,348 viewers, Voice of a Murderer 3,045,726 viewers, Secret Sunshine 
1,617,363 viewers, Midnight FM 1,223,352 viewers, Man of Vendetta 1,022,874 viewers, Heartbeat 
1,033,746 viewers, and Children 1,871,486 viewers. Only two movies of this genre, A Cruel 
Attendance and The ESP Couple, failed at the Korean box-office.
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sociological point of view. However, regardless of different perspectives one 
may take to approach this phenomenon, it seems certain that it is constitutive 
of very significant symptoms indicative of contemporary Korean society, 
especially with regard to the meaning of a child, more precisely, the way a 
child is conceived of by collective imagination because films on child 
abduction feature, among others, a kidnapped child: a child at risk or a child 
in danger. We can say that the representation of this “threatened child” 
dovetails in a certain way with the reality of the child in a risk society. In fact, 
numerous researches have been carried out to examine the correlation 
between the advent of risk society and child/adolescent problems such as 
pregnancy, childbirth, upbringing, education, child care, and anxiety of 
parents who raise a child (Scott, Jackson, and Backett-Millburn 1998; Jackson 
and Scott 1999; Lupton 1999; Kelly 2001; Wyness 2006, pp. 50-71). According 
to Claude Juveau, the child becomes an object of multiple reflexivities, 
inasmuch as it is exposed to various risks such as accidents, sicknesses, sexual 
crimes, environmental contaminations, and so on (Juveau 2006). This 
recurrent theme of the “threatened child” in a risk society is to be found, with 
striking similarity, in the aforementioned films in which a child falls prey to 
crime, parents are shocked by the crisis of their child’s safety, and the 
abductor symbolizes the most terrible hazard that can befall a child. 
In this sense, these films are, to borrow the concept of Niklas Luhmann, 
to be considered as self-observation par excellence of the risk society on the 
subject of child. Analyzing the kidnapped child represented in the films will 
lead one to more clearly comprehend the semantics of the child constituted 
under the logic of a risk society. In this context, this article attempts to 
examine the semantics of child in the following three stages. Firstly, I will 
propose to reflect upon some essential concepts of Luhmann, such as self-
observation (Selbstbeobachtung), meaning (Sinn), and semantics (Semantik), 
with a view to applying them to the interpretation of child abduction films. 
Secondly, I will analyze the main narratological elements of the genre, 
focusing on the antinomic aspects of the kidnapped child. Finally, I will 
investigate the semantics of child by employing another form of self-
observation in a risk society, that is, discourses on risk society. The main 
purpose of this article is to determine the meaning of child in a risk society in 
a clear conceptual scheme, and furthermore, to propose it as the starting 
point for further empirical research in the future. 
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Theoretical Reflections
In this article, several concepts proposed by Luhmann are employed to 
put forward the following hypothetic arguments: 1) the films of child 
abduction are to be considered as a certain form of self-observation of a risk 
society,3 and 2) the child represented in those films is an indicator of a 
specific “semantics” of child constituted under the dominant logic of a risk 
society. I will try to elucidate the following three key concepts employed in 
my hypothetic arguments: self-observation, meaning, and semantics.
Firstly, “observation” in the Luhmannian systems theory is a technical 
notion defined as “any operation that makes a distinction,” or more expressly, 
“designation by distinction” (Luhmann 1984, p. 73). For Luhmann, it is 
always a system that observes itself or its environment rather than a human 
subject or consciousness. Observation is one of the many operations 
permitting the systems to conduct their self-referential and autopoietic 
reproductions. According to Luhmann, modern society, which is highly 
complex and functionally differentiated, observes itself through various 
forms, such as the sciences, mass media (news, advertisements, and 
entertainments), novels, films, works of art, etc. In particular, Luhmann 
enumerates two functional sub-systems, science and mass media, as the 
principal systems whose essential task consists of self-observation of society 
(Luhmann 1996, 1997, p. 1139). He says that “what we know about our 
society, about the world in which we live, know, we know through the mass 
media” (Luhmann 1996, p. 9). Accordingly, when we attempt to examine the 
self-observation of a “risk society,” it would be worthwhile to refer to the films 
of child abduction (mass media) and discourses on risk society produced by 
various sociologists (science), given that both sociological discourses on risk 
society and films with a specific risk-related theme are a legitimate part of 
significant self-observations of a risk society. 
Secondly, as for the concept of meaning, it would not be erroneous to 
assert that Luhmann dissociates the notion of “meaning” from the ordinary 
sense of significance (Bedeutung) or from the canonical Weberian sense of 
“subjectively oriented meaning” (subjektiv gemeinte Sinn)4 (Weber 1968, p. 4). 
3 There are other forms of films that we can consider specific to self-observations of risk society, 
for example, disaster films. In these films featuring supernatural disasters, the child is typically 
represented as the final hope of humanity, surviving all kinds of dangers.
4 “Subjectively oriented meaning” is my translation, suggesting that the Weberian meaning is 
always oriented toward something: intentionality. Parsons translated “subjektiv gemeinte Sinn” into 
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From the perspective of Luhmann, “meaning” resides neither in semiotic 
entities like words, sentences, and propositions, nor in subjective interiority, 
given that meaning can’t be easily assimilated as a substance that can be 
delivered, discovered, and handled like a physical object. To the contrary, 
Luhmann posits meaning strictly as a medium/form through which the 
systems (psychic systems and social systems) incessantly observe themselves. 
Defined as “unity of actualization and virtualization” (Luhmann 1984, p. 65) 
and based on the difference between what is and what can be, meaning 
necessitates selection. It stems from the gap between actuality and possibility, 
and therefore, to have meaning means to have distinctions in three 
dimensions of, according to Luhmann, the fact dimension, the temporal 
dimension, and the social dimension (Luhmann 1984, pp. 74-82). Hence, it is 
by virtue of meaning that the psychic systems can engage in reflection and 
the social systems can conduct communications. This concept of meaning 
evolves into the concept of semantics by default, because the latter is none 
other than the cultural stock of meanings or the supply of themes of 
communications: 
Societal reproduction of communication must therefore progress by 
reproducing themes that recruit their contributions autonomously, so to 
speak. The themes are not created anew every time in each case, nor are 
they given adequate precision by language, like a vocabulary…. Therefore an 
intervening requirement mediates between language and interaction—a 
supply of possible themes that is available for quick and readily 
understandable reception in concrete communicative processes. We would 
like to call this supply of themes culture, and, if it is reserved specifically for 
the purposes of communication, semantics (Luhmann 1984, p. 163). 
Fundamentally, the Luhmannian concept of semantics refers to the 
structure of expectations that enhances the probability of the system’s 
operations: 
Taken abstractly, the concept of structure refers to communication or to 
action. The structures that link communication to communication include 
information, and because information relates to the world, they are 
“subjective meaning.” But in this case, the verb “meinen” is not taken into account. In the French 
translation, we see the expression “le sensvisésubjectivement” (Weber 1995, p.28). In this case, 
“meinen” is translated into “viser,” that is to say, “to be directed to.” The French translation doesn’t 
annihilate the nuance of “intentionality.”
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structures of the world. Within the system they comprehend everything that 
could be relevant for the system. To the extent that they hold ready forms of 
meaning that communication treats as worth preserving, we will at times 
also speak of semantics (Luhmann 1984, p. 282). 
And, although the semantics is part of the culture “handed down to us 
by the history of concepts and ideas” (Luhmann 1984, p. 163), it is not 
permanent but exposed to historical changes. For example, in Love as 
Passion, Luhmann analyzes the operation of the semantics of love in each 
transitional phase, from ideal love to passionate love, then to romantic love, 
and finally to love as a problem (Luhmann 1982). Also in Political Theory in 
Welfare State, he analyzes the transition of the semantics of political 
inclusion, from “benevolence” to “right” (Luhmann 1981, p. 26). To 
investigate the semantics of child in a risk society is equivalent to examining 
the way in which the child is constituted as a theme of meaningful 
observations (perceptions and communications) peculiar to the logic of risk 
society. And to investigate the way in which the child is constituted in such a 
way is to examine the self-observation of a risk society on the subject of child, 
that is, child abduction films and discourses on risk society. 
Semantics of Child in Films of Child Kidnapping
Double Contingency
Normally, the story commences with the abduction of a child by a 
kidnapper. The kidnapped child is menaced, threatened, and sometimes 
physically abused or killed. The child in these films is represented as utterly 
vulnerable and powerless, thereby subject to the demonic violence of the 
kidnapper who remains hidden and invisible. The most typical example of 
this is found in the film Voice of a Murderer (2006) directed by Park Jin-Pyo, 
in which the face of the kidnapper with a creepy, low-toned voice is kept 
hidden throughout the film. The criminal takes the child as hostage and 
starts ransom negotiations while ingeniously hiding him. He seems to 
mastermind the game. On the contrary, the parents in these films are 
bewildered and desperate. Demonstrating their inability to reason due to 
desperation in finding their child and alternating between hope and despair, 
they are depicted as having lost any sense of reality. To quote the title of a 
Korean film of that sort, they are literally “destroyed” (the original Korean 
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title of Man of Vendetta is the Destroyed Man). The police are not taken very 
seriously in these films. They intervene, but their performance is lackluster 
and without exception. The police are portrayed to be totally negligent, 
devoid of problem-solving skills, and even immoral at times.
Despite slight differences in the storylines of Korean child abduction 
films, it is hardly difficult to perceive their “ideal type,” for child abduction 
films usually employ a relatively simple and straightforward narrative 
structure. In most cases, child abduction films have two major narratological 
cores. The first is the missing child, in the sense that the disappearance of the 
child triggers the whole story. The second is the painful negotiations between 
the kidnapper and the parents. For, the story does not come to an end when 
the child returns, safe or dead, but it ends only when the negotiations 
between the two parties (the interaction as a type of social system) 
disintegrate. In this sense, I will analyze these two important apparatuses 
constitutive of the fundamental grammar of these films: 1) interaction 
between parents and abductor, 2) the missing child. 
First of all, we cannot help but recognize the strange characteristics of 
the interaction between the parents and the abductor in that it is highly 
improbable for the interaction to continue, i.e., to produce itself self-
referentially in Luhmannian terms insofar as the criminal remains hidden 
behind the creepy menacing voice over the telephone, trying to contact the 
parents at his own will. These two parties do not make any physical contact 
with each other, and there is hardly any trust between them. The parents 
suspect possible peril of their child, while the criminal suspects possible 
police intervention. 
There essentially exists such a wide chasm between the two parties that 
their communications seem almost doomed from the beginning. They are 
exactly situated in what Parsons calls “double contingency,” a situation in 
which one social actor (ego) is confronted by another actor (alter) and also in 
which they are unable to penetrate the consciousness of each other, like two 
black boxes stacked against each other: 
Thus consideration of the place of complimentary of expectations in the 
processes of human interaction has implications for certain categories which 
are central in the analysis of the origins and functions of cultural patterns. 
There is a double contingency inherent in interaction. On one hand, the ego’s 
gratification is contingent selection among available alternatives. But in 
turn, the alter’s reaction will be contingent on the ego’s selection and will 
result from a complementary selection on the alter’s part. Because of this 
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double contingency, communication, which is the precondition of cultural 
patterns, could not exist without both generalization from the particularity 
of the specific situations (which are never identical for ego and alter) and 
stability of meaning which can only be assured by “conventions” observed 
by both parties (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 16).
The establishment of the cinematographic grammar of child abduction 
films should be preceded by the settlement of the problem of this double 
contingency. However, the situation in the films does not work in favor of 
this. There is no non-contractual conditions for the contract asserted by 
Durkheim, no probabilities (chance) of mutual understanding suggested by 
Max Weber, no ideal situation of communicative rationality on which 
Habermas counted, no “shared symbolic system” as Parsons puts it, no 
commonality like common sense, sympathy, empathy, or solidarity between 
the two parties (Parsons and Shils 1951, p. 16). There is no one single value or 
morality exercising a powerful normative influence on both parties. The 
reality is exactly the opposite. The values sought by them clash with each 
other. The parents act under the sway of parental unconditional love, while 
the criminal is dominated by the pursuit of his inexorable self-interest. So 
what continues to make the story unfold despite the presence of these 
contradictory elements? How do the two parties produce sustainable 
interactions in these films? 
The Calculable and the Incalculable
It is paradoxically owing to this very difference that the interaction 
between the two is made possible. It is not identity but difference that 
facilitates the emergence and the operation of this social system. More 
precisely, the different “meanings” conferred respectively to the missing child 
make it possible for their communication to continue. The interaction 
between them can carry on with efficiency only when the parents remain 
eager to find their child safe and well, while the kidnapper remains cold-
hearted and emotionally detached from the child. If the parents are 
indifferent to the destiny of their child (this is the case of Cruel Attendance) 
or if the kidnapper fosters human affection toward the child, the story derails, 
becoming a comedy or a lighthearted drama. Only when a disparity exists 
between the respective meanings accorded the child can bargaining 
(communication) continue and be reproduced operatively. In a word, double 
contingency is resolved by the antinomic semantics of the kidnapped child. 
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In fact, it is not difficult to recognize that the meaning of the child is split 
into two distinctively contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the victimized 
child is viewed by the kidnapper as a price, a calculable value, akin to that of a 
lifeless commodity. The child, whose value is thus measured and priced, is 
the very nucleus of the dead-end negotiations between the two parties. For, 
from the perspective of the kidnapper, the child signifies nothing more than a 
disposable object that can be taken, bought, sold, or exchanged. The 
victimized child thereby acquires a measurable quantitative value, which is 
materialized in ransom. As mentioned above, the ransom does not 
necessarily take a monetary form. Even when the kidnapper abducts not for 
the purpose of earning money but for some other reasons, there is always an 
exact calculation of the “price” or “value” of the child. The kidnapper always 
seeks to achieve a set objective in exchange for the child, whether it is money, 
vengeance, or other forms of symbolic exchange. Were it not for this 
fungibility of the child and of its monetary value or symbolic equivalent, the 
story will not unfold properly in a child abduction film. The abductor is only 
concerned about the instrumental potentiality of the child that can fulfill his 
personal objective. In this sense, for the abductor, the meaning of the child is 
exclusively focused on its quality of being calculable. 
To the contrary, the same child is perceived by the parents in a 
diametrically opposing manner, i.e., as the most priceless being. In this case, 
the child embodies something absolute, invaluable, and nearly sacred, to the 
extent that the parents are willing to sacrifice anything to rescue the child. At 
first sight, it may seem entirely natural for the parents of a kidnapped child to 
act in an emotionally-charged manner. However, it should be also noted that 
this actualized meaning attached to the child is, in fact, just one of the many 
potential meanings given to the child under normal circumstances. For 
example, although the child may mean a source of happiness and a fruit 
borne of their mutual love, the same child “could” simultaneously represent a 
burden, a problem, or an obstacle to career success for the parents in 
everyday life, in late modern context in particular. However, as soon as the 
child is taken away by the criminal and its life threatened, the meaning of the 
child is circumscribed around its incomparable importance. The “meaning” 
of the kidnapped child is exactly based on this difference between actuality 
and potentiality. From this perspective of the parents, the ransomed child has 
no equivalent in the world. Nobody can replace the child. S/he is precious 
beyond measure, and likewise, his/her importance is beyond calculation. For 
the parents, the missing child is equal to the most valuable object of love that 
is incalculable and even sacred. 
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Logic of Insurance
It is not difficult to recognize that the semantics of child in these films 
partakes of a manifest contradictory duality: the child as the calculable and 
the child as the incalculable. This double and antinomic semantics of child 
permits the social system (interaction) to overcome the double contingency 
and to produce itself autopoietically and self-referentially. But how can the 
incalculable coexist with the calculable5 in the same figure? What is the 
principle of the conjunction of the calculable and the incalculable incarnated 
in the child? In the context of child abduction films, this question can be 
answered by a narratological paradox which commands the semantics of the 
kidnapped child. Namely, the child is treated as the most priceless (by the 
parents) only when s/he is treated as the most priced (by the abductor). The 
inverse is also true. The child is the most calculable, precisely because s/he is 
the most incalculable. The logical combination of these two opposing values 
is dependent on the narratological coexistence of two different perspectives. 
This interesting paradox determines the subjectivity of the abducted child 
represented in films. The more rationally s/he is dealt with (by the abductor), 
the more irrationally or emotionally s/he is dealt with (by the parents). The 
result is a kind of singular mixture between rationality and emotionality. 
However, this bizarre antinomic semantics of child, crystallized in a 
magnificent manner by cinematographical imagination, is not a mere 
chimeric and fantastic cultural fabrication but exactly reflects the logic of a 
certain modern institution closely related to risk management, which is none 
other than insurance. The insurance is, as Mitchell Dean formulates it 
perspicaciously, “an attempt to make the incalculable calculable” (Dean 1999, 
p. 138). It is the typical apparatus of preliminary protection based on rational 
calculus against a variety of possible hazards comprising problems that would 
be normally considered to be beyond calculative rationality, such as life, 
health, diseases, the body, and even the soul. Once these essential qualities of 
human life are subsumed under the logic of the insurance, they are no longer 
considered to be purely dependent on the providential force such as fortune, 
luck, or destiny; rather, they are viewed as susceptible to control and 
management by rational procedures. In this sense, the insurance produces 
risk in the strictest sense of the word. More precisely, it is through the 
5 The scientific tentative to evaluate a child has been done by many psychologists, economists, 
and anthropologists (Esterlin 1975; Zelizer 1985, p. 7; Folbre 2008; Jung and Jin 2008, p. 150).
 Risk or Totem? 319
invention and application of the technology of insurance that the dangers of 
modern life are transformed into the new category of perception, which is no 
other than the risk: 
In everyday language the term ‘risk’ is understood as a synonym for danger 
or peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone; it 
designates an objective threat. In insurance the term designates neither an 
event nor a general kind of event occurring in reality (the unfortunate kind), 
but a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a 
group of individuals—or, more exactly, to values or capitals possessed or 
represented by a collectivity of individuals: that is to say, a population. 
Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, 
anything can be a risk; it all depends how one analyzes the danger, considers 
the event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a category of 
understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intuition (Ewald 1991, p. 
199).
As the dominant “technology of risk” (Ewald 1991, p. 198) capable of 
reshaping the reality with its strong performative competences, the insurance 
necessarily entails calculative rationality (Beck-Gernsheim 1996, p. 142), but 
it is thereupon applied to the very obscure regions of the possible tragedies of 
human lives (accidents) governed hitherto by the imaginary of divine 
providence, so transcending the limits of human rationalities. Insurance 
promises to calculate the incalculable, to recover the irrecoverable, to 
compensate what can’t be compensated. In this promise, two different 
ontological dimensions merge, in the figure of the kidnapped child. On the 
one hand, insurance widens and deepens the rationalization of life world, 
inviting social agents to count on their calculative faculty to provide against 
contingent misfortunes. On the other hand, the same technology of 
insurance results in highlighting, presumably unwittingly, the indelible value 
of the incalculable aspects of life. For, what should be insured rationally is 
exactly what can’t be recuperated at all, for example, parts of the body, life 
itself, and the child. Viviana Zelizer points out this irony, especially in her two 
books, Moral and Markets (1983) and Pricing the Priceless Child (1985), in 
which she presents the argument that the first appearance of children’s life 
insurance triggered a public backlash in America in the late 19th century. 
According to her, pure rationality did not agree with the prevalent public 
moral sense of the era. As a result, the companies could not help but make a 
compromise and promote the concept of insurance as a ritual motivated by 
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love and care for children. That is to say, insurance is not always and 
necessarily based on the principle of calculating the incalculable but 
functions as a vehicle that voluntarily turns the calculable child into the 
incalculable. The incalculable child was sanctified in the very process of 
falling under the category of the calculable, the logic of insurance (Zelizer 
1978, 1983, 1985). 
In this respect, we can say that the logic of rationalization cannot be 
dissociated from the logic of irrationalization, particularly on the subject of 
the meaning of child. On the plane of life world everyday activities of the late 
modern period molded by the ever-expanding logic of private insurance 
(O’Malley 1996, pp. 198-202), child is treated semantically in an increasingly 
rationalized way, precisely to the extent that it is treated semantically in an 
increasingly irrationalized way.6 People try to price the priceless child (by 
purchasing insurance for him/her), just because the priceless can be 
authentically priceless only if and insofar as it is priced under the protection 
of rational technology of insurance. In this sense, we can say that rationality 
and irrationality do not exclude each other, but they are in a singular 
complementary and simultaneous correlation. 
If we go back to the films of child abduction, it is not so difficult to 
observe the same movement of double logic akin to the above-mentioned 
operation of insurance. The perspective of the abductor represents, without 
any doubt, the typically calculative rationality of a risk. On the contrary, the 
perspective of the parents expresses what appears to be irrational infatuation 
with the incalculable. The first perspective views the child as a risk, and the 
second views the child as a totem. Child is constituted as a risk when the 
problems concerning him/her are dealt with and resolved in a strictly rational 
manner, whereas child is constituted as totem when the parents harbor 
emotional intensity and irrational affection for their child. What is important 
is that these two contradictory logics are inseparably intertwined with each 
other in the meaning of child. If this kind of semantics of child is the 
cinematographic self-observation of a risk society, it remains for us to 
investigate the sociological self-observation of a risk society in discourses on 
risk society.
6 In Korea, the first insurance for children appeared in November 1996, “Insurance of Love of 
Children” by Dae-Shin Life Insurance Company. 
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Semantics of Child in Discourses on Risk Society 
Absence of Child in Korean Discourses on Risk Society
Following the examination of the double semantics of child represented 
in those films, I will now introduce another form of self-observation of a risk 
society, sociological discourses on risk, in an attempt to find the “functional 
equivalent” of the double semantics. I will look into discourses on Korean 
risk society first, followed by European discourses.7
As is well known, the concept of a risk society was introduced in the late 
1990s and functioned as one of the most important and perspicacious 
intellectual lenses through which the Korean society of that time observed 
and criticized itself sociologically. In the context of Korean society, discourses 
on risk society, which flourished from the late ’90s to the early, had a 
tendency to mostly focus on the explication of a variety of catastrophic 
incidents that happened at the time. As is well known, Korean society 
experienced a chain of miserable accidents during that period.8 In an attempt 
to shed light on the reasons for which these calamities happened, many 
7 As is well known, 1986 saw the publication of two important works in Europe that proposed the 
concept of risk as an important perspective in the analysis of society: Risk Society of U. Beck and 
L’État providence (The Welfare State) of F. Ewald. There was a variety of differences between the two. 
For example, Beck is of the tradition of critical theory, while Ewald is a Foucauldian. Beck’s concept 
of risk is fundamentally inspired by environmental catastrophes, while Ewald’s concept of risk is 
strictly confined to social dimensions. But it is important to note that they evoke almost 
unanimously and simultaneously the new possibility of conceiving modernity under the sign of risk. 
Five years later, Luhmann rigorously distinguishes risk (Risiko) from danger (Gefahr). If certain 
damage is attributed to a decision-making, we call it a risk. On the contrary, if the damage is 
attributed to the environment, we call it a danger (Luhmann 1991, p. 21-8). In fact, it is Foucault 
who proposes the concept of risk in the analysis of the establishment of new modern 
governmentality named “apparatus of security” (dispositif de sécurité) during his lecture at the 
Collège de France in January 1978 (Cf. Foucault 2004, pp. 57-81). 
8 A series of catastrophic events took place in Korea in 1993, including the January collapse of 
Uam Shopping Mall in Cheongju (28 people dead), the March derailment of a train in Busan (78 
people dead), the July crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 733 (66 people dead), and the October sinking 
of a ferry off the coast of Wi Island (292 people dead). The year 1994 saw a fire on a cruise ship (29 
people dead), the collapse of Seongsu Bridge (32 people dead), and a gas explosion in Mapo (13 
people dead). The year 1995 saw a gas explosion in a subway station in Daegu (101 people dead) and 
the collapse of Sampung Department Store in June (502 people dead). In August 1997, Korean Air 
Flight 801 crashed in Guam (254 people dead) and the IMF financial crisis erupted during the same 
year, inflicting a social catastrophe on a large segment of the population in Korea. In June 1999, an 
accident in a youth training center in Hwaseong claimed the lives of 23 people, while 192 people 
died in a subway accident in 2003. 
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sociologists appealed to the notion of “risk society” proposed by Beck as a 
conceptual framework. Basically, numerous sociologists reached the 
agreement that the principal reason for the outbreak of disastrous events 
could be attributed to the fundamental defects of Korean modernization 
process (Chang 1998; Han 1998; Lee 1998). Many sociologists suggest a set of 
descriptive notions that qualify the specificities of Korean risk society. Kim 
Dae-Hwan proposes the notion of “double risk society” propelled by “reckless 
developmentalism,” Chang Kyung-Sup the notion of “complex risk society,” 
Sung Kyung-Ryung the notion of “total risk society,” Lee Dong-Hun and 
Chung Tae-Suk the notion of “backward risk society” (Chang 1997; Kim 
1998; Sung 1998; Chung 2003).
Most of these diagnoses share as a common denominator the perception 
that the modernization of Korean society did not take place at a normal pace 
compared to the modernization of its Western counterparts, and therefore, in 
order to prevent similar calamities henceforth, Korean society should achieve 
a high level of modernity that is fundamentally founded on the technical 
efficacy of governing potential hazards (No 2004a, p. 209; No 2004b, pp. 
99-100). 
Herein lays the ironic idiosyncrasy of Korean discourses on risk society 
of the times. Namely, the concept of risk employed in these diagnoses was not 
really faithful to the original concept of risk set forth by Beck, Ewald, and 
Luhmann (Beck 1986; Ewald 1986; Luhmann 1991). Firstly, the concept of 
risk proposed by European theorists considers high modernity as the very 
source of problems, rather than as a solution, which signifies that a risk 
society results from its historical and reflexive process rather than from the 
lack of normal modernity (Beck 1994). Secondly, for European theorists, the 
concept of risk does not refer to real-life accidents or events. Instead, it 
indicates a form of interpretation, according to which these happenings 
acquire a social meaning.9 Although there are some polemical aspects to it, 
“risk society” as defined by Beck or Luhmann has nothing to do with 
“dangerous” society, but it points to a certain type of society where potential 
problems are perceived in the category of risks that is based on rational 
9 M. Dean and A. Scot point to the fact that for Beck, the concept of risk still contains realistic 
connotations (Dean 1999, p. 136; Scott 2000, p. 38). It is true that the position of Beck vacillates 
between constructivist perspective and realistic perspective. He says in Risk Society, “risks have 
something unreal about them…. In a fundamental sense they are both real and unreal” (Beck 1986, 
p. 33). He considers risks as something that “cannot be experienced as such,” and also as the 
“objectified negative images of utopias” (Beck 1986, p. 28). In Weltrisikogesellschaft, Beck makes a 
distinction between risk and danger/catastrophe (Beck 2007, p. 29). 
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management of danger. In consideration of these two notable connotations, it 
would be fair to argue that the aforementioned discourses on Korean risk 
society do not conform to the original concept of risk. In the first analysis, 
these discourses did not penetrate the paradox of modernity that some of the 
successes of the first modern era returned as risks during the late modern era. 
Secondly, they did not regard risk as a constructivist framework functioning 
in a transcendental way, so to speak, as a sort of Foucauldian épistémè. 
Instead, they regard risk as a real threat happening in an empirical and 
phenomenal world. Discourses on Korean risk society of the ’90s were not 
exactly based on the concept of “risk society,” but on the impression of 
“dangerous society.”
This Korean academic trend brought about the following theoretical 
consequences. The first theoretical consequence was that discourses on risk 
society declined as a major theme of public sociology. It is true that in the 
new millennium, Korean society seems to have transcended the abysmal state 
of being incapable of coping with basic safety problems that haunted Korean 
society in the 1990s. During that same period, however, Korean society seems 
to have displayed other symptoms of turning into a risk society in many 
facets of social life: increasing awareness of individual, familial, and social 
security, growing anxiety about environmental issues, including problems 
concerning food, air, and water, and the emergence of well-being culture that 
values happiness and emotional fulfillment more than material successes. 
Strictly speaking, it is not in the ’90s but in the new millennium when Korean 
society was in need of acute scientific self-observation through the concept of 
risk. The second consequence was that discourses on Korean risk society did 
not comprise of intimacy. Various problems concerning intimacy were not 
considered to bea legitimate theme of dominant discourses on risk society: 
love, friendship, sexuality, marriage, divorce, pregnancy, delivery of a baby, 
child-rearing, aging, and pure relationships, etc. At the center of these themes 
that are worthy of examination under the sign of a risk society lies, in fact, the 
very figure of child. 
The child should be perceived in terms of risk and risk society, especially 
in the new millennium when there appeared a variety of cultural symptoms 
(self-observation of society) indicating a transformation of semantics of the 
child. For the period of industrialization (from the 1970s to the 1980s), child 
was viewed as the future subject of national progress. For the period of 
democratization, child was viewed as a future citizen endowed with civic 
potentialities (from the late 1980s to the late 1990s). But in the new 
millennium, especially after the financial crisis of 1997, Korean society 
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observed the child from a different point of view under the influence of 
multi-dimensional structural transformations (neo-liberalization, 
globalization, and the advent of a risk society). According to my argument, 
the new semantics of the child is as risk and as totem. Unfortunately, it is not 
sociology but child abduction films that succeeded in observing this curious 
semantics of child in contemporary Korean risk society.
Child as Risk-Totem 
From the outset, European theories on risk society were interested in the 
intimate spheres of social life absorbed in the process of “risk societalization.” 
We know that nearly all prominent theorists of late modernity attempted to 
shed light on the transformation of intimate life in contemporary society 
which is under the influence of de-traditionalization and individualization 
(Luhmann 1982b; Beck 1986, pp. 103-26; Giddens 1991, 1993). According to 
them, in the second modern era, intimacy itself is already reconstructed as a 
risk. Individualization is an important factor of this phenomenon. Each 
person acts as the legislator and judge of his own life. He is obliged to make 
free choices in selecting existential life courses, bearing responsibility for the 
consequences, whether positive or negative. Life in a risk society is 
fundamentally reconfigured as a “planning project” (Beck-Gernsheim 1996, 
p. 139), and all the important tasks of life (parenthood, upbringing, health, 
etc.) have a tendency to be attuned to the rationalization of the conduct of life 
and to the attribution of responsibilities to independent individuals. 
Comprehensively and insistently examining the infiltration of the risk 
semantics into the dimension of intimacy, Beck-Gernsheim indicates the 
transition of the child’s meaning from the traditional “Gift of God” to “a 
difficult object for treatment” (Beck-Gernsheim 1996, pp. 143-4). As she put 
it, the child becomes a problem (Kinderfrage) insofar as having a child 
becomes an important subject of reflection and decision for women in late 
modern society. Briefly speaking, the child embodies a risk on the semantic 
level (Beck-Gernsheim 1988, 1998).
However, this is merely one side of reality. In parallel to this 
rationalization of intimacy, we can perceive a movement that progresses in 
the opposite direction: sanctification of intimacy. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
argue that in our era, love has turned into a “secular religion” and the “god of 
privacy” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1990, pp. 11-2). If a new religiosity 
springs from intimacy, especially from love, the child represents a veritable 
symbol of this sanctity. Although he does not make explicit use of the notion 
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of “totem,” Beck writes as follows in his Risk Society: 
The Child is the source of the last remaining, irrevocable, unexchangeable 
primary relationship. Partners come and go. The child stays. Everything that 
is desired, but not realizable in the relationship, is directed to the child. With 
the increasing fragility of the relationships between the sexes the child 
acquires a monopoly on practical companionship, on an expression of 
feelings in a biological give and take that otherwise is becoming increasingly 
uncommon and doubtful. Here an anachronistic social experience is 
celebrated and cultivated which has become improbable and longed for 
precisely because of the individualization process. The excessive affection 
for children, the “staging of childhood” which is granted to them–the poor 
overloved creatures–and the nasty struggle for the children during and after 
divorce is some symptoms of this. The child becomes the final alternative to 
loneliness that can be built up against the vanishing possibilities of love. It is 
the private type of re-enchantment, which arises with, and derives its 
meaning from, disenchantment. The number of birth is declining but the 
importance of child is rising (Beck 1986, p. 118).
It would be ironic to note that in the process of individualization, 
reflexive modernization, consolidation of a risk society, and finally, extension 
and intensification of the rationalization process, the child is viewed with a 
very different logic, that of unconditioned love and affection containing a 
quasi-religious value.10 The child takes on the significance of a totem, an 
emblem of a certain community, just like in the Durkheimian sense of the 
word. The child is worshipped, sanctified, and consecrated. This kind of 
totemization of the child is found in many sectors of late modern societies. 
The child is a family totem with which its parents are almost obsessed and for 
which they carry heavy responsibilities (Furedi 2002). Cases of violence 
against children instantly arouse a strong emotionally-charged response in 
people, just as in the case of pedophilia, for example (Binard and Clouard 
1997). The civil society raises questions about children’s rights (Hartas 2008). 
If the tendency to semantically treat the child as a risk goes parallel to this 
different tendency to semantically treat the child as a totem, we can 
determine the semantics of child operating in discourses on risk society in 
10 Martha W. Lear describes the landscape of a modern American family as being rearranged by 
the introduction of the filio-centric way of life, consisting of what she calls pedocracy (rule by the 
children) (Lear 1965).
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the following form: the child is a risk-totem.
Conclusion
So far, I have analyzed the semantics of child in a risk society by 
examining the two different layers of self-observation of a risk society (films 
on child abduction and discourses on risk society). I subsumed the semantics 
of child under the concept of totem-risk. That is to say, a risk society has the 
tendency to constitute the meaning of child as a risk-totem complex. It also 
means that in a risk society, the child may be conceived, understood, 
imagined, thought of, treated, educated, hospitalized, dreamt of, desired, and 
governed simultaneously as a risk and as a totem. Thus, the semantics of a 
“risk-totem” is a sort of medium through which meaningful observations and 
communications are efficiently conducted on the subject of child. In films, 
this semantics is embodied in the figure of the kidnapped child, who appears 
to the abductor as a risk (in the sense that the child is viewed in a totally 
calculating way) and, at the same time, to the parents as totem. In discourses 
on risk society, the child appears as a very important figure, because it is a 
symbol of the rationalization process of the intimate sphere (risk) and also of 
the final, remaining mythology of romantic love (totem). In this case, the 
character of the hyphen (-) linking the totem and the risk is not accidental or 
random, as it has something to do with mutual determination. Namely, the 
child is viewed and treated as a risk because/he is viewed and treated as a 
totem, and vice versa. We can make use of this semantic scheme of “risk-
totem” to further investigate the way other sub-systems of late modern 
society semantically treat the subject of child. In order to examine the 
formation and operation of the semantics of child as a risk-totem in the 
Korean context, we should probe into various social dimensions as follows: 1) 
institution/jurisdiction in legal/political systems, 2) representation/discourses 
in the mass media and education, and 3) rituals/practices in the family. These 
tasks will demand subsequent researches that will be more empirical than the 
present theoretically-oriented research conducted on the semantics of child. 
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